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THE STRUGGLE TO RISE ABOVE
THE SHADOWS BEFORE SUNSET:
A CRITICAL DISCUSSION ON THE NEED TO LIFT
THE EXPIRATION AND RENEWAL
REQUIREMENTS OF DACA AND DAPA
Anna Oguntimein*
Reasoning that judicial economy is best served when a law
enforcement agency determines how to expend its limited enforcement
resources, the Supreme Court has held that the decision to exercise
prosecutorial discretion is presumptively unreviewable. 1 In the realm
of immigration law, Deferred Action for Childhood Arrivals (DACA)
and the recently announced Deferred Action for Parents of Americans
and Lawful Permanent Residents (DAPA) promote the goal of judicial
economy by imposing a freeze on the deportation of eligible
noncitizens who either entered the United States as children or who2
have a child who is a U.S. citizen or lawful permanent resident (LPR).
In doing so, these programs conserve enforcement resources on these
low priority cases. The social policy underlying DACA is that children
or individuals brought to the U.S. as children lack the intent to violate
immigration laws and should not be removed from the only country
Anna Oguntimein is a 2015 graduate of the University of the
District of
Columbia David A. Clarke School of Law. Anna would like to thank her family, the
UDC Law Review editors, Professor Kristina Campbell, and above all, God, for
making this possible.
I See Heckler v. Chaney, 470 U.S. 821, 831 (1985).
2 Memorandum from Janet Napolitano, Secretary, Dep't of Homeland Sec., to
Alejandro Mayorkas, Director, U.S. Citizenship
& Immigration Serv.,
http://www.dhs.gov/xlibrary/assets/s 1-exercising -prosecutorial -discretionindividuals-who-came-to-us-as-children.pdf
[hereinafter 2012 DACA Memo];
Memorandum from Jeh Charles Johnson, Secretary, Dep't of Homeland Sec., to
Leon Rodriguez, Director, U.S. Citizenship & Immigration Serv. (Nov. 20, 2014),
http://www.dhs.gov/sites/default/files/publications/14_1120_memo-deferred-action.
pdf [hereinafter 2014 Deferred Action Memo].

they know as home. DAPA, which shields the parents of U.S. citizens
and LPRs from removal, hinges on the public interest in protecting the
family unit.4 To date, the DAPA program has been suspended due to a
federal court injunction order. 5 DACA relief lasts two years and is
renewable but only for an additional two years.6
Given that the general presumption against the judicial review of
prosecutorial discretion works to conserve limited enforcement
resources, the DACA and DAPA programs, exercises of prosecutorial
discretion, should not be subject to expiration. Upon the expiration of
these programs, recipients will be susceptible to being charged as
inadmissible. As a result, their low priority cases will divert
enforcement resources away from high priority cases. 7 Therefore, to
further the goals of efficiency and justice, the Obama Administration
should lift the expiration and renewal requirements on these deferred
action programs.
INTRODUCTION

Diane Guerrero, an actress who stars in the popular Netflix series
"Orange is the New Black," recently shared with CNN that she came
home one day to find that her parents and older brother had been
deported. 8 Guerrero was not the first to share a story like this, but
because of her celebrity status, her interview captured large media
attention. Describing the day it happened, she told CNN that "their
cars were there, dinner was started, the lights were on but I could not
find them." 9 Only fourteen at the time, Guerrero, a U.S. citizen,
remained in the United States. She had to rely on friends and
neighbors to get her through high school and into college.10 Guerrero
explained that she knew about her parents' immigration troubles and
3 2012 DACA Memo, supra note 2.
4 2014 Deferred Action Memo, supra note 2.
5 EXECUTIVE ACTIONS ON IMMIGRATION, U.S. CITIZENSHIP & IMMIGRATION

SERV. (Apr. 15, 2015), http://www.uscis.gov/immigrationaction.

6 FREQUENTLY ASKED QUESTIONS, U.S. CITIZENSHIP & IMMIGRATION
SERV.

http://www.uscis.gov/humanitarian/consideration-deferred-action-childhoodarrivals-process/frequently-asked-questions (last visited Apr. 3, 2015).
7 2012 DACA Memo, supra note 2.
8 See Eric Bradner, 'Orange is the New Black' Actress Pushes Obama for
Immigration Overhaul, CNN, Nov. 19, 2014, http://www.cnn.com/2014/11/17/
politics/oitnb-actress-on-immigration/.
9 Id.
10

Id.

that they tried to legalize their status for many years, but there was no
relief available to them.11 As a result, Guerrero lived in fear that her
12
parents would be taken away-until the day her fear was realized.
Guerrero pleaded with the Obama Administration to create a solution
to keep families together. 13
About a year earlier, Erika Andiola came forward to CNN with a
similar story and the same plea. 14 Unlike Guerrero, Andiola was far
from famous, and an undocumented migrant. 15 Still, Andiola was well
known among immigrant rights activists as a fervent advocate for
undocumented youth. 16 Andiola was at home when Immigration and
Custom Enforcement (ICE) agents came in the night to take her
mother and brother. 17 After they were detained, Andiola called
immigration officials requesting their release. is Like Guerrero,
Andiola turned to the media to explain what happened to her family.
Andiola was more fortunate than Guerrero. Although immigration
officials told Andiola that her mother would be deported right away,
ICE decided
to exercise discretion and release her mother and
19
brother.
Like Guerrero and Andiola, the trailblazers of the modern
immigrant rights movement are often the children of undocumented
migrants who are unwilling to live in the shadows and determined not
to leave their parents behind. These trailblazers' efforts would
culminate in deferred action programs that would offer some respite
from the fear of deportation and bring them one step closer to their
goal of legalizing the status of many undocumented individuals. 20 This
paper explains why the DACA and DAPA programs, which advance
the goals of justice and efficiency, should not be subject to expiration
or renewal. Part I presents the Supreme Court's view on the rights of
immigrant youth and the problem with casting undocumented migrants
11 Id.
12 Id.
13

Id.
14 See Cindy Y. Rodriguez & Janet DiGiacomo, Agents Take Mother of
Immigration Activist in Night Home Raid, CNN, Jan. 12, 2013, http://www.cnn.
comi/2013/01/12/us/immigration-activist-mother-detained/.
15 Id.
16 Id.
17 Id.
18 Id.
19 Id.

20 See 2012 DACA Memo, supra note 2; 2014 Deferred Action Memo,
supra

note 2.

into an underclass. Part II discusses the failed efforts to pass the
DREAM Act, and the genesis of DACA and DAPA. Part III provides a
historical overview of judicial review. Part IV provides an overview of
prosecutorial discretion and discusses its application at both the micro
and macro level in immigration law. Part V explains the problems with
the expiration and renewal requirements of DACA and DAPA. This
Note concludes with the solution that the goals of justice and
efficiency will be best served if the Obama Administration lifts the
expiration and renewal requirements on DACA and DAPA.
I.

PLYLER V. DOE-SETTING THE STAGE FOR THE UPRISING OF
IMMIGRANT YOUTH

In Plyler v. Doe, a seminal case concerning the educational rights
of undocumented children, the Supreme Court referred to children of
21
undocumented parents as special members of the shadow population.
According to the Court:
Sheer incapability or lax enforcement of the laws
barring entry into this country, coupled with the failure
to establish an effective bar to the employment of
undocumented aliens, has resulted in the creation of a
substantial "shadow population" of illegal migrantsnumbering in the millions-within our borders. This
situation raises the specter of a permanent caste of
undocumented resident aliens, encouraged by some to
remain here as a source of cheap labor, but nevertheless
denied the benefits that our society makes available to
citizens and lawful residents. The existence of such an
underclass presents the most difficult problems for a
Nation that prides itself on adherence to principles of
equality under law. The children [of this population] are
special members of this [class] .22
The Court in Plyler overturned a Texas law 23 that denied
undocumented children public education, reasoning that although a
state may withhold its beneficence from those who are unlawfully
21 Plyler v. Doe, 457 U.S. 202, 218 (1982).
22

Id. at 219.

21 Id. at 223-24 (finding that Texas law in dispute did not meet rational basis

test); TEX. EDUC. CODE ANN. § 21.031 (2013).

present in the United States, this principle does not apply with the
same force to the children of such illegal entrants. 24 It explained that
children have no control over the conduct of their parents or their own
status, thus imposing penalties on these children, such as denied access
to education, was unjust. 25 Finally, the Court opined that
undocumented children were already disadvantaged by poverty and
undeniable racial prejudices; without an education, these individuals
would, like their parents, become permanently locked into an
underclass. 26 Unbeknownst to the Court at the time, some of these
children would not only rise above this underclass but would also
usher their parents out of the shadows on a path know as deferred
action.
II. BACKGROUND ON THE DREAM ACT, DACA, AND DAPA

Education alone could not prevent the children in Plyler from
falling into the underclass. These individuals needed a shift in the tides
of immigration law and policy that would lift them and their families
out of the shadow population. For many years, they depended on
immigrant rights advocates to lobby congress for immigration
reform. 27 At the forefront of the effort to push immigration reform was

the Development, Relief, and Education for Alien Minors (DREAM)
Act. 2 8 This act had the greatest potential to lift the children of the
shadow population out of the underclass. After the legislation failed,
undocumented youth and immigrant rights activists intensified

pressure on the president to take action. As a result of the efforts of
immigrant rights advocates, the president granted deferred action to
individuals who came
to the country as children, and parents of U.S.
29
LPRs.
and
citizens

Plyler,457 U.S. at 219.
Id. at 220.
26 Id. at 208.
27 Laura Gilbert, Obama's Ruby Slippers: Enforcement Discretion in the
Absence of ImmigrationReform, 116 W. VA. L. REV. 255, 269 (2013).
28 Development, Relief, and Education for Alien Minors Act, H.R. 1842, 112th
Cong. (2011); Development, Relief, and Education for Alien Minors Act, S. 952,
24

25

112th Cong. (2011).
29 See 2012 DACA Memo, supra note 2; 2014 Deferred Action Memo, supra
note 2.

A. The Journey to the DREAM
The DREAM Act was a bipartisan bill originally authored by
Senators Orrin Hatch (R-UT) and Richard Durbin (D-IL) that, if
passed, would have provided legal status for millions of eligible
undocumented youth and a pathway to citizenship. 30 The legislation
had been presented to Congress in various forms at least twenty-four
times. 3 1 The specific details of each form of the bill may have varied,
but the core requirements have remained the same. 32 The bills, similar
to the 2011 DREAM Act, 33 generally required the applicant to have:
1. Arrived in the United States before the age of fifteen;
2. Been present in the United States for five years prior to
the passage of the bill;
3. Been a person of good moral character and have a clean
criminal record;
4. Obtained a GED or high school diploma or been
admitted to an institution of higher learning;
5. Been thirty five years of age or younger on the date of
the enactment.3 4
Applicants who met these requirements would have received
conditional permanent residence for six years, during which time they
would have had to complete two years of a bachelor's program or
higher degree program, or serve in the military. After satisfying these
requirements, the conditions on the green card would be removed and
they would eventually be able to apply for citizenship. 36 It was based
on this legislative proposal that the term "DREAMers" was coined to
describe the children of undocumented individuals.
After several failed attempts to pass immigration reform and the
DREAM Act, undocumented immigrant youth began a social

Development, Relief, and Education for Alien Minors Act, S. 1291, 107th
Cong. (2001); Heather Fathali, The American Dream: DACA, Dreamers, and
Comprehensive Immigration Reform, 37 SEATTLE U. L. REV. 221, 237 (2013).
31 Fathali, supra note 30, at 238.
30

32 Id.

33 Development, Relief, and Education for Alien Minors Act, H.R. 1842, 112th

Cong. (2011).
34 Id.
35 Id.
36 Id.

movement to advocate for their cause. 37 They formed communities,
created organizations, and engaged in marches and protests in the
hopes that publicizing their plight would gain the attention of the
country and the president. 38 The pressure on the Obama
Administration to act intensified on the heels of the 2012 election.3 9
With no success in passing immigration reform, as promised in his
first presidential campaign,
President Obama had to find another way
40
to court the Latino vote.
B. DACA-A Minor Immigration Victory
While members of the Administration told President Obama that
he did not have the authority to grant DREAMers relief from removal,
UCLA law professor Hiroshi Motomura authored a letter explaining
why it was in the executive's power to exercise prosecutorial
discretion to grant such relief.41 The letter laid out three forms of relief
that were in the Administration's power to grant:
deferred action,
42
departure.
enforced
deferred
and
parole in place,
The letter explained that deferred action, originally known as nonpriority enforcement status, is a form of prosecutorial discretion
available to the executive branch.
The executive branch has
exercised this enforcement authority as far back as 1971, and federal
44
courts have acknowledged this executive power since the mid-1970s.
More recently, the Obama Administration exercised this power with
regard to widows and children of U.S. citizens, while
legislation to
45
grant them statutory relief was under consideration.
A grant of deferred action can prevent an individual from being
placed in removal proceedings, suspend any removal proceeding that

37 See Corey Dade, A New Generation of 'Dreamer's' Goes Public, NAT'L
PUB. RADIO, June 28, 2011 http://www.npr.org/2011/06/28/137476280/a-new-

generation-of-dreamers -goes -public.
38 Id.
39 Carrie Budoff Brown, Jake Sherman & Manu Raju, 2012 Election Puts
Spotlight
on
Immigration
Reform,
POLITICO,
Nov.
8,
2012,
http://www.politico.com/news/stories/1112/83552.html.
40 Id.
41 Gilbert, supra note 27, at 272.
42 Letter from Hiroshi Motomura et al., to President Barack
Obama (May 28,
2012), availableat http://www.nilc.org/document.html?id=754.
43 id.
44 id.
45 Id.

has begun, or stay the enforcement of an existing removal order. 46 A
grant of deferred action also allows the recipient to apply for
employment authorization. 47 Section 103 of the Immigration and
Nationality Act (INA) provides the general authority for deferred
action. 48 Although the statute does not define specific terms for
deferred action, the United States Supreme Court has established that
the decision to initiate or terminate
removal proceedings falls within
49
the authority of the executive.
Parole-in-place, which refers to a form of parole granted by the
executive, was also discussed in Motomura's letter. 50 Section 212 of
the Immigration and Nationality Act (INA) provides that the Attorney
General may, in his discretion, on a case by case basis, temporarily
parole any alien into the United States based on an urgent
humanitarian reason, or for a significant public benefit. 5 1 Individuals
granted parole are also eligible for work authorization. 52 Parole allows
a noncitizen to lawfully remain in the United States but does not
constitute "admission" under the INA. 53 In the past, presidents have
paroled noncitizens who did not qualify for admission under existing
immigration law. 54 While the statute specifies a case-by-case
determination, historical practice demonstrates that discretionary
judgments may be based on group circumstances. 55 For instance,
former Presidents Carter and Clinton used their parole authority to
allow Cubans into the United States. 56 In May 2010, the Obama

46

Id.

47 Id.
48 8 U.S.C. §

1103(a) ("The Secretary of Homeland Security shall be charged

with the administration and enforcement of this chapter and all other laws relating to
the immigration and nationalization of aliens, except insofar as this chapter or such
laws relate to the powers, functions, and duties conferred upon the president,
Attorney General, the Secretary of State, the officers of the Department of State, or
diplomatic or consular officers: Provided, however, That determination and ruling by
the Attorney General with respect to all questions of law shall be controlling.").
49 Motomura et al., supra note 42.
50 Id.
51 8 U.S.C. § 1182(d)(5)(A) ("The Attorney General may . . . in his discretion
parole . . . on a case-by-case basis for urgent humanitarian reasons or significant
public benefit any alien applying for admission to the United States .....
52 Motomura et al., supra note 42.
51 8 U.S.C. § 1182(d)(5)(A).
54 Motomura et al., supra note 42.
55 Id.
56 Id.

Administration granted parole to spouses, parents,
and children of U.S.
57
military.
States
United
the
in
serving
citizens
Finally, Motomura's letter discussed deferred enforced departure
58
(DED), a form of prosecutorial discretion similar to deferred action.
Similar to deferred action, the executive's power to grant DED is
provided under section 103 of the INA. 59 DED has historically been
used in response to disturbed conditions in specific countries;
however, it is not limited to such 61
situations. Recipients of DED may
authorization.
work
for
be eligible
Motomura forwarded the letter to ninety-six law professors for
signature and on May 29, 2012, a group of DREAMers and their
attorneys hand delivered the finalized letter to the White House. 62 The
letter provided the legal backing the White House needed. 63 On June
15, 2012, in the Rose Garden, President Obama announced his
administration's new immigration
policy and explained the public
64
DACA:
behind
policy rationale
[I]t makes no sense to expel talented young people,
who, for all intents and purposes, are Americansthey've been raised as Americans; understand
themselves to be part of this country-to expel these
young people who want to staff our labs, or start
new businesses, or defend our country simply
because of the actions of their parents-or because
of the inaction of politicians.

.

.

.

Effective

immediately, the Department of Homeland Security
is taking steps to lift65the shadow of deportation from
these young people.

57 Id.
58 Id.

59 8 U.S.C. § 1103(a).
60 Deferred Enforced Departure, U.S. CITIZENSHIP & IMMIGRATION
SERV.,
http://www.uscis.gov/humanitarian/temporary-protected-status-deferred-enforceddeparture/deferred-enforced-departure (last visited Apr. 3, 2015).
61 Id.

62 Motomura et al., supra note 42.
63 Id.
64 Barack Obama, President of the United States, Remarks by the President on

Immigration (June 15, 2012) (transcript available at https://www.whitehouse.
gov/the-press-office/2012/06/15/remarks-president-immigration).
65 Id.

On the same day, Secretary of State Janet Napolitano announced
the DACA program in a memorandum. 66 She directed that certain
noncitizens who entered the United States as children and did not pose
a national security or public safety risk would be eligible for relief
from removal from the country. 67 To qualify for DACA an applicant
must:
1. Have come to the United States before the age of
sixteen;
2. Have resided in the United States continuously for five
years preceding June 15, 2012 and been present in the
United States on June 15, 2012;
3. Be in school, or have graduated from high school, or
have obtained a GED, or have been honorably
discharged from the armed forces;
4. Have not been convicted of a felony, significant
misdemeanor, or multiple misdemeanors, or present a
national security or public safety
risk;
68
5. Be under the age of thirty-one.
Although DACA did not provide the benefits of the DREAM Act,
it did offer work authorization and relief from removal; a small victory
for DREAMers. 69 Immigrant rights activists continued pushing
Congress for immigration reform and encouraging the president to
pursue greater executive action. A glimmer of hope for DREAMers
came in 2013, when the Senate passed a comprehensive immigration
reform bill that included the major components of the DREAM Act
70
and an earned pathway to citizenship for many other noncitizens.
The glimmer, however, turned to darkness when the bill failed to move
forward in the House. 71 Although DACA has been the closest form of
relief to the DREAM Act in that it provides undocumented youth
protection from removal and work authorization, it still confers no
72
legal status.
66 2012 DACA Memo, supra note 2.
67 Id.
68 Id.
69 Id.
70 Border Security, Economic Opportunity, and Immigration Modernization
Act of 2010, S. 744, 113th Cong. (2013).
71 Id.
72 See 2012 DACA Memo, supra note 2; FREQUENTLY ASKED QUESTIONS,

supra note 6.

C. The New Era of Deferred Action
Not all individuals unlawfully present stand to benefit from the
DACA and DAPA programs, and those noncitizens who do not benefit
are still vulnerable to removal.7 3 The application process for the
DAPA and expanded DACA programs was supposed to begin
February 18, 2015, but has been suspended due to a federal court
injunction order.74 Thus, at any time, the Department of Homeland
Security (DHS) can commence removal proceedings against
undocumented noncitizens who do not have deferred action
protection.7 5 In cases similar to Andiola's, where family members
were not lawfully admitted into the country, they can be removed
immediately without notice to the rest of the family. 76 The end result
of this type of removal us traumatic family separation.
Through protests, the immigrant rights community demanded that
the President put a stop to deportations that separate families. 77 In
2013, President Obama responded to these demands by stating that
broadening the protection of DACA to families exceeds his legal
authority. 78 But after almost two years of Congress failing to move
meaningful immigration legislation, the President conceded to some of
the activist's demands. On November 20, 2014, President Obama
announced DAPA, deferred action for the parents of U.S. citizens and
LPRs. 79 To be eligible for DAPA an applicant must:
1. Have a U.S. citizen child;
2. Have maintained to continuous residence in the
United States for at least five years;
3. Pass a background check; and
73 See EXECUTIVE ACTIONS ON IMMIGRATION, supra note 5; See Texas v.
United States, No. B-14-254, 2015 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 18551 (S.D. Tex. Feb. 16,
2015).
74 See supra note 73.
75 8 U.S.C. § 1225 (b)(1).
76 Id.

Julia Preston & Helen Cooper, After Chorus of Protest, New Tune
Deportations, N.Y. TIMES, June 17, 2012, http://www.nytimes.com!2012/06/18
/us/politics/deportation-policy-change-came-after-protests.html.
78 Glen Kessler, Obama'sRoyal Flip-flop on Using Executive Action on Illegal
Immigration, WASH. POST, Nov. 18, 2014, http://www.washingtonpost.com/blogs/
fact-checker/wp/2014/11/18/obamas-flip-flop-on-using-executive-action-on-illegalimmigration/.
79 See EXECUTIVE ACTIONS ON IMMIGRATION, supra note 5.
77

s
4. Pay taxes. o

Pointedly absent from President Obama's announcements of
DACA 81 and DAPA, 82 was an explanation of the short term relief
these programs offer and the required renewal process. Recipients of
DACA must reapply every two years. 83 DAPA recipients must reapply
every three years. 84 In addition, they must submit the renewal
application no later than four months before the expiration date but no
earlier than five months before its expiration. 85 This leaves only a6
thirty-day window to reapply. There is also a $465 fee to apply.
Finally, since the program is an act of discretion, final decisions
cannot be appealed. 87
If the deferred action is not renewed for some reason, it will cause
those who have protection against removal to lose that protection, and
therefore be susceptible to being charged as inadmissible. Thus, even
though the executive branch has already chosen to exercise
prosecutorial discretion concerning these individuals, if their deferred
action expires and they are placed in removal proceedings, the issue of
whether they should be removed from the country will be reviewed
again by the immigration court and if appealed, by the court of
appeals.
The loss of deferred action protection will lead to judicial
inefficiency. Moreover, case law establishes that the general
presumption against the judicial reviewability of prosecutorial

8o Press Release, White House, Office of the Press Secretary (Nov. 20, 2014),

http://www.whitehouse.gov/the-press-office/2014/11/20/fact-sheet-immigrationaccountability-executive-action [hereinafter President Obama's November Press
Release].
81 Barack Obama, President of the United States, Remarks by the President on
Immigration (June 15, 2012) (transcript available at https://www.whitehouse.gov/the
-press -office/20 12/06/15/remarks -president-immigration).
82 The President Speaks on Fixing America's Broken Immigration System,
WHITE

HOUSE

(Nov.

20,

2014),

https://www.whitehouse.gov/photos-and-

video/video/2014/11/20/president-speaks-fixing-americas-broken-immigrationsystem.
83 See EXECUTIVE ACTIONS ON IMMIGRATION, supra note 5.
84 YOU MAY BE ABLE TO REQUEST DAPA, U.S. CITIZENSHIP & IMMIGRATION

SERV. (Jan. 30, 2015), http://www.uscis.gov/sites/default/files/USCIS/Executive
Actions/EAFlierDAPA.pdf.
85 See EXECUTIVE ACTIONS ON IMMIGRATION, supra note 5.
86 Id.
87 FREQUENTLY ASKED QUESTIONS, supra note 6.

discretion conserves enforcement resources. 88 The expiration of
deferred action counters this goal by providing an opportunity for
judicial review of the exercise of prosecutorial discretion concerning
undocumented youth and parents of U.S. citizen and LPR children.
III. HISTORICAL OVERVIEW OF JUDICIAL REVIEW

In the 1889, the Supreme Court held that Congress has plenary
power to regulate immigration. 89 The Court concluded that inherent in
a nation's sovereignty is the power to exclude foreigners. 90 Moreover,
the Court held
that no court can review the immigration laws passed
91
by Congress.
Since 1891, federal statutes provided that executive branch orders
in deportation and exclusions cases were final and bestowed no review
authority on the courts. 92 However, detained noncitizens could seek
review of a final order of deportation or exclusion through a writ of
habeas corpus, a remedy guaranteed by the Constitution. 93 Habeas
corpus review was the standard basis of court jurisdiction to review
immigration agency decisions until 1955. 94
Prior to recent decades, it was understood that noncitizens could
not petition for a writ of habeas corpus until they were in actual
physical custody. 95 By then, however, noncitizens may have had to sell
their belongings, bid farewell to their families, and await court while
in physical custody. 96 Thus, the habeas
corpus remedy proved to be a
97
noncitizens.
for
major disadvantage
Litigants sought judicial review without having to undergo
physical custody. 98 They were unsuccessful in using the 1934
Declaratory Judgment Act, 28 U.S.C. § 2201, or the 1946
Administrative Procedure Act (APA), as applied to pre-existing
88 See Chaney, 470 U.S. at 831.
'9 See Chae Chan Ping v. United States, 130 U.S. 581, 600 (1889).
90 See id. at 609.
91 See id. at 606.
92 THOMAS ALEXANDER ALEINIKOFF ET AL., IMMIGRATION AND CITIZENSHIP
PROCESS AND POLICY 1272-73 (7th ed. 2012).
93 id.

94 Shaughnessy v. Pedreiro, 349 U.S. 48, 75 (1995) (An alien ordered deported
could use a declaratory judgment action to test the legality of the order under the
INA combined with the 1946 APA, which had generous review provisions).
95 Id.
96 id.

97 id.
98 Id.

immigration laws. 99 In 1955, however, the Supreme Court decided that
to deny judicial review, other than by habeas corpus, would not be in
keeping with the provisions of the then-new INA or the APA and as
such made declaratory and injunctive relief available to test
deportation orders. 100 Fearing that the court access permitted by
Pedreiro would be abused and extend review beyond reasonable
bounds, Congress enacted INA section 106 in 1961.101 This provision
was the first to specifically govern the review of exclusions and
deportation orders. 10 2 Under section 106(b), habeas corpus remained
the exclusive means for review of exclusion orders. 103 For deportation
cases, however, section 106(a) took on a different approach. Congress
mandated that the sole and exclusive procedure for judicial review of
all final orders shall be set forth in the 104
Hobbs Act, which gave
exclusive jurisdiction to the court of appeals.
The 1961 scheme remained intact until 1996, when it was
significantly amended by the Illegal Immigration Reform and
Immigrant Responsibility Act (IIRIRA).105 IIRIRA eliminated separate
systems of judicial review for exclusion and deportation orders and
provided a single scheme for removal orders, explicitly made the "sole
and exclusive means for judicial review."' 10 6 Further, it conferred
exclusive jurisdiction over the review of final removal orders to the
court of appeals. 107 It also barred judicial review of any decision that is
specified under the INA to be within the discretion of the Attorney
General. 10 Thus keeping in line with Congress's history, IIRIRA
significantly curtailed judicial review in a variety of ways.10 9 As stated
by the Supreme Court in Reno v. American-Arab Anti-Discrimination
Committee, "[o]f course many provisions of IIRIRA are aimed at
protecting the Executive's discretion from the courts-indeed, that can
fairly be said to be the theme of the legislation."' 110

99 Id.
100 Pedreiro,349 U.S. at 75.

101ALEINIKOFF ET AL., supra note 92, at 1,272.
102

Id.

103

Id.

104

28 U.S.C. § 2342.
Illegal Immigration Reform and Immigrant Responsibility Act of 1996,

105

Pub. L. No. 104-208, 110 Stat. 3009-546 (1996).
106 Id.
107

Id.
108 Id.
109 Id.

110 Reno v. Am.-Arab Anti-Discrimination Comm., 525 U.S. 471, 486 (1999).

IV. OVERVIEW OF PROSECUTORIAL DISCRETION

The theme of protecting the executive's discretion from judicial
review is also evident in the evolution of prosecutorial discretion in
immigration law. Prosecutorial discretion is the power that every law
enforcement agency has to decide whether to take enforcement action
against an individual."' In creating the INA, Congress bestowed on
112
the executive branch the authority to enforce immigration laws.
Further, the executive branch has the unmitigated authority to decide
whether to pursue removal. 113 As explained in Chaney, "an agency's
decision not to prosecute or enforce, whether through civil or criminal
process is a114decision generally committed to an agency's absolute
discretion."'

Prosecutorial discretion promotes judicial economy by conserving
resources. 115 Since the government has limited resources, permitting
an agency and its officers to refrain from asserting the full scope of
their authority against particular populations or individuals saves costs

and allows the agency to focus its efforts on truly high priority
matters.116 According to Chaney:

III Memorandum from Doris Meissner, Commissioner, U.S. Citizenship &
Immigration Serv., to Immigration & Naturalization Serv. Staff (Nov. 17, 2000),
http://iwp.legalmomentum.org/reference/additionalmaterials/immigration/enforcement-detention-and-criminal-justice/governmentdocuments/22092970-INS-Guidance-Memo-Prosecutorial-Discretion-DorisMeissner- 11 -7-00.pdf/view [hereinafter Meissner Memo].
112 See 8 U.S.C. §1103(a). ("The Secretary of Homeland Security shall be
charged with the administration and enforcement of this chapter and all other laws
relating to the immigration and nationalization of aliens, except insofar as this
chapter or such laws relate to the powers, functions, and duties conferred upon the
president, Attorney General, the Secretary of State, the officers of the Department of
State, or diplomatic or consular officers: Provided, however, That determination and
ruling by the Attorney General with respect to all questions of law shall be
controlling.").
113 Id.
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http://www.justice.gov/sites/default/files/olc/opinions/attachments/2014/11/20/201411 -19-auth-prioritize-removal.pdf.

[A]n agency decision not to enforce often involves a
complicated balancing of a number of factors which are
peculiarly within its expertise. Thus, the agency must
not only assess whether a violation has occurred, but
whether agency resources are best spent on this
violation or another . . . and, indeed, whether the
agency has enough resources to undertake action at all.
An agency cannot act against each technical violation
of the statute it is charged with enforcing. The agency is
far better equipped than the courts to deal with the
many variables
involved in the proper ordering of its
117
priorities.
In addition to economic interests, prosecutorial discretion also
considers humanitarian concerns, as noted by the Court in Arizona v.
United States:
Discretion in the enforcement of immigration law
embraces immediate human concerns. Unauthorized
workers trying to support their families, for example,
likely pose less danger than alien smugglers or aliens
who commit a serious crime. The equities of an
individual case may turn on many factors, including
whether the alien has children born in the United
States, long ties to the community, or a record of
distinguished military service. Some discretionary
decisions involve policy choices that bear on this
Nation's international relations. Returning an alien to
his own country may be deemed inappropriate even
where he has committed a removable offense or fails
to meet the criteria for admission. The foreign state
may be mired in civil war, complicit in political
persecution, or enduring conditions that create a real
risk that the alien or his family will be harmed upon
return. The dynamic nature of relations with other
countries requires the Executive Branch to ensure that
enforcement policies are consistent with this Nation's
foreign policy with respect to these and other
realities. 118
U.S. at 831.
118 Arizona v. United States, 132 S. Ct. 2492, 2499 (2012).
117 Chaney, 470

Thus, prosecutorial discretion is instrumental in serving justice and
efficiency. Not only does the decision to exercise discretion consider
humanitarian and economic factors, it also has a far reaching impact at
both individual and broad-based levels.
A. Individual ProsecutorialDiscretion:From "Non-Priority" to
DeferredAction
Little was made public about prosecutorial discretion at the micro
or individual level until the early 1970s in a series of cases involving
Beatles rock star John Lennon. 119 The Immigration and Naturalization
Services (INS) "non-priority program" was an operation that
categorized cases which presented "appealing humanitarian factors" as
non-priority for prosecution. 120 Lennon, who was placed in deportation
proceedings for overstaying his visa, argued 12that
in cases similar to his
1
prosecution.
decline
to
it was INS's practice
Pursuant to the Freedom of Information Act, Lennon sought
records relevant to the "non-priority" category of cases hoping that
they would confirm the agency practice and reveal his eligibility for
relief. 122 He eventually obtained the records and consequently INS
made public the details of its non-priority program. 12 3 Non-priority
status later became termed deferred action. 124
Deferred action has evolved from a little known INS program to a
common form of relief recognized by the Supreme Court and

119 Letter from E. A. Loughran, Associate Commissioner, Immigration &
Naturalization Serv., to Leon Wildes, at 2 (July 16, 1973) (describing a "non-priority
case[]" as "one which the Service in the exercise of discretion determines that
adverse action would be unconscionable because of appealing humanitarian
factors"). See INS Operating Instructions § 103. 1(a)(1)(ii) (1962).
120 See Leon Wildes, The Nonpriority Program of the Immigration and
Naturalization Service Goes Public: The Litigative Use of the Freedom of
Information Act, 14 SAN DIEGO L. REV. 42, 42-49 (1976); Lennon v. Immigration &
Naturalization Serv., 527 F.2d 187 (2d Cir. 1975) (Lennon was not ordered deported
based on the judicial interpretation of the removal ground for which he was charged
and eventually gained permanent resident status.).
121 Wildes, supra note 120, at 42-49.
122
123
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124 Am.-Arab Anti-Discrimination Comm., 525 U.S. at 484; see INS Operating
Instructions § 103.1(a)(1)(ii) (1977) (directing immigration officers to make deferred
action available when "adverse action would be unconscionable because of the
existence of appealing humanitarian factors").

Congress. 125 The Court explained in Chaney, Congress "may limit an
agency's exercise of enforcement powers if it wishes, either by setting
substantive priorities, or by otherwise circumscribing an agency's
power to discriminate among issues or cases it will pursue." 126
Congress, however, has never acted to limit deferred action
programs. 127 Between 2001 and 2009, legacy INS and DHS have
extended deferred action to, among other classes, victims of human
trafficking and certain violent crimes, foreign students affected by
Hurricane Katrina, and widows and widowers of deceased U.S.

citizens.

128

In 2001 INS instructed immigration officers to identify foreign
victims of certain violent crimes or human trafficking and prevent their
removal using mechanisms such as deferred action, parole, or stay of
removal. 129 The purpose of this action was to give these individuals the
opportunity to apply for visas made available under the Victims of
Trafficking and Violence Protection Act of 2000 (VTVPA). 130
VTVPA created two visa categories, T and U visas, available to
victims of human trafficking and victims of certain crimes.131 T visa
applicants who could show prima facie eligibility were granted an
automatic stay of removal and those placed on the visa waiting list
maintained stay of removal, parole, or deferred action status. U visa
applicants
who made the same showing also qualified for such
133
relief.
After Hurricane Katrina in 2005, DHS granted deferred action to
foreign students who were unable to maintain their F-1 student visa
125 Am.-Arab Anti-Discrimination Comm., 525 U.S. at 484; see also, e.g., 8

U.S.C. § 1154(A)(1)(D)(i)(J), (IV) (providing deferred action for certain eligible
individuals).
126 Chaney, 470 U.S. at 833.
127Thompson, supra note 116.
128
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Commissioner, Immigration & Naturalization Serv., to Michael A. Pearson,
Executive Associate Commissioner, Immigration & Naturalization Serv., Victims of
Trafficking and Violence Protection Act of 2000 (VTVPA) Policy Memorandum
#2-"T" and "U" Nonimmigrant Visas 2 (Aug. 30, 2001) [hereinafter 2001 T and U
Visa Memo].
130Id.
131 Victims of Trafficking and Violence Protection Act of 2000, Pub. L.
No.
106-386, §§ 107(e), 1513(b)(3), 114 Stat. 1464 (codified at 8 U.S.C. §
1a01(a)(a5)(T)(i), (U)(i)).
132 See 8 C.F.R. § 214.11(k)(1), (k)(4), (m)(2).
133 See 8 C.F.R. § 214.14(d)(2).

status due to the devastation caused by storm.i34 Eligible students were
required to apply for deferred action by submitting a letter
substantiating their need for the relief, along with an application for
work authorization. 135
In 2009, DHS announced that it would extend deferred action to
widows and widowers of U.S. citizens. 136 According to the United
States Citizenship and Immigration Services (USCIS), the deferred
action program was implemented because "no avenue of immigration
relief exist[ed] for the surviving spouse of a deceased U.S. citizen if
the surviving spouse and the U.S. citizen were married less than 2
years at the time of the citizen's death."1 37 USCIS emphasized that the
grant of deferred action was 138
not automatic and that eligible noncitizens
relief.
such
for
apply
to
had
B. Broad ProsecutorialDiscretion versus DeferredAction
Broad prosecutorial discretion, or widespread enforcement
discretion, results from the decision to set enforcement priorities. 139 As
explained in the 2010 Morton Memo, ICE has the resources to remove
about 400,000 noncitizens a year-less than four percent of the
unauthorized population in the United States. I4 This limited removal
capacity is the driving force behind priority enforcement decisions and
134
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214(f)(6)), available at http://www.uscis.gov/sites/default/files/USCIS/Human
itarian/Special%20Situations/Previous%20Special%20Situations %20By%2OTopic/f
aq-interim-student-relief-hurricane-katrina.pdf (last visited Apr. 17, 2015).
135 Press Release, U.S. Citizenship & Immigration Serv., USCIS Announces
Interim Relief for Foreign Students Adversely Impacted by Hurricane Katrina 1-2
(Nov.
25,
2005),
available
at
http://www.uscis.gov/sites/default/files/
files/pressrelease/FiStudent 11 25 05 PR.pdf (last visited Apr. 17, 2015).
136 Memorandum from Donald Neufeld, Acting Associate Director,
to Field
Leadership, U.S. Citizenship & Immigration Serv., Guidance Regarding Surviving
Spouses of Deceased U.S. Citizens and Their Children 1 (Sept. 4, 2009) [hereinafter
2009 Surviving Spouses Memo].
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Customs Enforcement, on Civil Immigration Enforcement: Priorities for the
Apprehension, Detention, and Removal of Aliens (June 30, 2010), available at
http://www.ice.gov/doclib/news/releases/2010/civil-enforcement-priorities.pdf
[hereinafter 2010 Morton Memo].

clearly influences which noncitizens will be removed. 141 DHS and
legacy INS, have long employed guidance on prioritizing and
deprioritizing the enforcement of immigration laws against certain
categories of noncitizens. 142 The executive authority to make such
decisions 14has
been established by the Supreme Court as well as
3
Congress.
The outcry that followed the passage of the IIRIRA set the stage

144
for macro-level prosecutorial discretion beginning in the 1990s.
Following media reports of highly sympathetic cases that were
ineligible for relief, a bipartisan group from the House wrote a letter to
the attorney general and
. INS Commissioner Doris Meissner requesting
,,145
them to "implement guidelines for INS prosecutorial discretion.
In
November 2000, Meissner released a memorandum providing
guidance on exercising prosecutorial discretion. 146 The memo
emphasized factors to consider in exercising discretion such as length
of stay in the United States and humanitarian reasons.147 The Meissner
memo has remained relevant in immigration law and spurred several

other memoranda on prosecutorial discretion that followed.148

In October 2005, William Howard, principal legal advisor for ICE,
issued another memorandum on prosecutorial discretion.
141
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142 See, e.g., INS Operating Instructions § 103(a)(1)(i) (1962); Memorandum

from John Morton, Director, U.S. Immigration & Customs Enforcement, to All Field
Office Directors, Special Agents in Charge, and Chief Counsel (Jun. 17, 2011),
http://www.ice.gov/doclib/secure-communities/pdf/prosecutorial-discretionmemo.pdf [hereinafter 2011 Morton Memo]; Memorandum from John Morton,
Director, U.S. Immigration & Customs Enforcement, to All ICE Employees, Civil
Immigration Enforcement: Priorities for the Apprehension, Detention, and Removal
of Aliens (Mar. 2, 2011); Meissner Memo, supra note 111.
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memo established that in cases where no national security or public
safety risks exist, ICE should balance the cost of action against the
value of the result. 15In June 2011, John Morton, director of ICE,
issued a memorandum on exercising discretion, which provided more
specific guidelines and emphasized the cost and justice considerations
of its predecessors. 151
Broad prosecutorial discretion differs from deferred action in
several ways. Firstly, deferred action offers employment authorization
to eligible applicants. 152 Secondly, class-based deferred action, which
includes DACA and DAPA, establishes threshold eligibility criteria
but also allows discretion for case-by-case determinations. 153 Thus,
immigration officials have the discretion to deny any deferred action
application even if the applicant satisfies all the eligibility
requirements. 154 This practice of individualized review "helps avoid
potential concerns that, in establishing such eligibility criteria, the
Executive is attempting to rewrite the law by defining new categories
of aliens
who are automatically entitled to particular immigration
155
relief.
V. THE NEED FOR DEFERRED ACTION

In the absence of immigration reform, executive action has become
a necessary means to deal with the current population unlawfully
present in the United States. The Supreme Court has bestowed on
Congress the plenary power to regulate immigration and has made
clear that no court can review the immigration laws Congress chooses
to pass. 156 Thus, restructuring the immigration system can only occur
by congressional action. Although there is widespread agreement that
the current immigration system is broken, Congress has been unable to
unify in support of a large-scale solution since 1996.157 Consequently,
court dockets remain backlogged and many removal cases have ended
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157 Illegal Immigration Reform and Immigrant Responsibility Act of 1996,
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in unjustifiable hardship such as the removal of children from their
homes and the separation of many families.158
Without legislative action to remedy these problems, there has
been a growing need to find solutions without Congress. As history
has shown, the President's power to set enforcement priorities and
provide limited forms of relief is the most direct means to cure these
ills where Congress refuses to act. Because Congress has not reformed
the immigration system in almost twenty years and the current laws
continue to yield untenable results, executive action-in the form of
deferred action-is in order.
A. DeferredAction Serves HumanitarianConsiderationsof Justice

Deferred action has proven to be one of the most effective forms of
prosecutorial discretion to address some of the problems in the U.S.
immigration system because it serves humanitarian considerations of
justice. For instance, the public policy underlying DACA-that
individuals brought to the United States as children had no control
over the circumstances behind their entry and therefore should not be
sanctioned for their unlawful status-engenders
a basic sense of
159
justice and natural inclination to protect children.
Although the educational rights of undocumented children were at
issue in Plyler, the Court's reasoning equally applies to DACA
because it speaks to the injustice of punishing children for
circumstances they neither caused nor control. 160 As stated by the
Court, "obviously no child is responsible for his birth and penalizing
the child

. .

. is an ineffectual way-as well as unjust-way of

deterring the parent. ' 161 The Court concluded that it is difficult to
conceive of a rational justification for penalizing the undocumented
children for their presence within the United States. 162 Like the
litigants in Plyler, DACA eligible noncitizens cannot affect their
parent's conduct or their own immigration status. 163 Thus, visiting
condemnation on them does not comport with "the basic concept of
our system that legal burdens should bear some relationship to
158 JEB BUSH ET AL., COUNCIL ON FOREIGN RELATIONS, U.S. IMMIGRATION
POLICY, INDEPENDENT TASK FORCE REPORT No. 63 (2009).

159 See 2012 DACA Memo, supra note 2.
160 Plyler v. Doe, 457 U.S. 202, 220 (1982).
161 Id.
162 Id.
163 Id.

individual responsibility and wrongdoing."' 164 By protecting recipients
from removal, the DACA program mitigates some of the legal burden
that undocumented children have had to bear.
Further, DACA comports with immigration law and policy. For
instance, immigration law provides that minors cannot accrue unlawful
presence. 165 Thus, the penalties that are triggered when a noncitizen
has been unlawfully present for six months or more do not apply to
minors. 166 Because minors cannot accrue unlawful presence while in
the United States, they should be protected from removal based on
unlawful presence or entry-and for some individuals, programs like
DACA provide this protection from removal.
DACA advances basic considerations of justice with respect to
undocumented adults who were brought to the U.S. as children.
Individuals who come and live in the United States as children develop
deep roots and strong ties to the country. These ties are unbreakable
for those who have immediate and extended U.S. citizen relatives.
DACA eligible individuals are raised, educated, and grounded in
American communities. Many of them know only the United States as
home and do not speak the native language of their country of
nationality.167 Further, these talented and productive young people
who have already made significant168 contributions to American society
should be protected from removal.
Thus, prosecutorial discretion is justified on behalf of DACA
eligible individuals because they were not the cause of their unlawful
status, they have strong ties to the United States, and they are an
invaluable part of their community. Finding the contrary would mean
that noncitizens who have been raised, educated, and established in
American communities would be removed from the United States once
they become adults because they fell into an unlawful immigration
status as a minor or upon reaching majority age. The practice of lying
in wait until undocumented children reach adulthood to punish them
for their immigration status is tantamount to trapping them into
unlawful conduct. Basic principles of fairness support protecting
noncitizens who arrived in the country as children from this fate. For
164
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166 See id.
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this reason, justice requires protection, such as deferred action, for
noncitizens who arrived to the United States as children.
Many of the aforementioned arguments that support DACA also
support deferred action to shield parents of U.S. citizens and LPRs
from removal, because this deferred action focuses on keeping families
together. Undocumented children should not bear the burden of a
circumstance they did not cause, and neither should U.S. citizen or
LPR children. When the parent of a U.S. citizen or LPR child is
deported, the child is either abandoned or, in effect, deported along
with the parent when forced to leave the United States to follow the
parent to the parent's country of origin. This places great hardship on
the U.S. citizen and LPR children and presents a problem for the
United States, which aims to protect children through its laws.
Furthermore, immigration law recognizes that U.S. citizen and
LPR children should not be forced to bear undue or extreme hardship
as a result of their parent's immigration violation. To this end, there
are several waivers available for noncitizens who violate immigration
laws if their removal would cause extreme hardship to their U.S.
child. 169 Thus by allowing some latitude for parents of U.S. citizens
who are in technical violation of the law, U.S. citizen children are
protected from bearing the burden of the legal consequences of their
parent's immigration violations.
Deferred action furthers the public interest in protecting family
unity. The family unit is the building block of American society and
the parent-child relationship is core to the family unit. Iv7 The current
immigration system, however, does not work to keep families together,
as families are separated when one or more family members are placed
in removal proceedings. 17 1 Prior to the recently announced deferred
action for parents of U.S. citizen and LPR children, parents who were
ordered removed were forced to abandon their children or remove their
children from the children's home country. Considering the
importance of the family unit to the viability of American society,
executive action to shield parents of U.S. citizen and LPR children
169

See 8 U.S.C. § 1182(h)(1)(iii)(B) ("The Attorney General may in his

discretion, waive the application of . . . the alien's [if] denial of admission would
result in extreme hardship to the United States citizen or lawfully resident spouse,
parent, son, or daughter of such alien.").
170 In re Grand Jury Proceedings, 103 F.3d 1140, 1160 (3d Cir. 1997).
171 See Ginger Thompson & Sara Cohen, More Deportations Follow Minor
Crimes, Records Show, N.Y. TIMES, Apr. 6, 2014, http://www.nytimes.com/
2014/04/07/U.S./more-deportations-follow-minor-crimes-data-shows.html?_r=0.

from removal is appropriate and necessary in an immigration system
that does not function to keep families together.
Finally, deferred action supports humanitarian considerations of
justice because it is in line with the moral conscience of the country.
The American people have already formed judgments about who is
morally deserving and likely to succeed in this country. Public opinion
polls show that more than half of Americans support creating a
pathway to legal status for those unlawfully present in the United
States. 172 These facts demonstrate that programs, like deferred action,
are viewed as a fair and just way of dealing with the undocumented
community, not only by those who benefit but also by the majority of
Americans.
One of the most common concerns associated with deferred action
is that the practice incentivizes breaking immigration laws and yields
an unfair result because it confers benefits to noncitizens who are
unlawfully present, while many individuals have followed the rules,
completed the proper paperwork, and waited patiently in their home
countries to come to the United States have not received the same
benefits. These arguments demonstrate a lack of understanding of our
current immigration system, which is broken.
Family-based immigration is extremely slow and does not work to
reunite families. 173 As a result of quotas, waiting periods for
sponsoring family members can extend over a decade.174 Additionally,
employment-based immigration is not working to respond to the
demands of the U.S. labor market. 175 In 2008, only 76,000 employees
and 90,000 spouses and children received green cards based on
employment, while 800,000 migrants a year enter the United States
without status and find jobs in the United States. 176 This happens
primarily because illegal migration responds quickly to market
pressures and does not present the lengthy waits and significant
expense required for hiring foreign workers. 17 It is the long wait
periods and lack of opportunities to legally immigrate to the country
that incentivizes illegal migration.

Megan Thee-Brenan, Immigration: What Americans Think, N.Y. TIMEs,
June 11,
2014, http://www.nytimes.com/2014/06/12/upshot/immigration-whatamericans-think.html?r=0&abt=0002&abg= 1.
173 BUSH ET AL., supra note 158.
172

174 Id.
175 Id.
176

Id.

177 Id.

DACA and DAPA will not incentivize noncitizens to enter
illegally because these programs only protect individuals who were in
the country at the time the program was announced, and do not apply
to any noncitizen who enters the United States thereafter. Additionally,
the DAPA program includes increased enforcement measures to deter
illegal entry.178
There is a great deal at stake concerning the undocumented
population in the United States-the economy, the lives of U.S. citizen
and LPR children, and the preservation of the family unit. As such, the
United States cannot afford to refrain from addressing immigration
problems within its borders, based on conjecture that unlawful entry
may become more attractive for some individuals. Rather, Congress
should take legislative action to rectify the issues that allow
individuals to enter without inspection or overstay the length of their
visas. We cannot, however, wait for congressional action while
families are being separated and children are suffering. For this reason,
it is necessary for the executive to exercise his authority to address
these issues using the power of prosecutorial discretion.
B. DeferredAction Advances JudicialEconomy

Deferred action promotes judicial economy by directing limited
enforcement resources from low priority cases to high priority cases.
According to the 2010 Morton memo, the immigration system's
removal capacity is about 400,000 removals annually-less than four
percent of the unauthorized population. 179 Given the limited
enforcement resources, enforcement priorities have become necessary
to identify low and high priority cases. The Meissner memo and a
cascade of prosecutorial memos that followed identified individuals
who are childhood arrivals or parents of U.S. citizen or LPR children
as low priority cases. By exercising prosecutorial discretion as to these
individuals, the executive frees enforcement resources, which would
have been used to effectuate their removal, to be used for higher
priority cases.
President Obama's executive action also promotes efficient
management of the immigration court docket. In recent years, there

178 President Obama's November Press Release, supra note 80.
179 2010 Morton Memo, supra note 140.

has been a surge in removal cases. 18° In 1992, immigration judges
heard 110,000 deportation and exclusion cases. 181 By 2010,
immigration judges received 318,000 removal cases.182 Immigration
judges also ruled on 50,000 bond redeterminations and disposed of
14,000 other motions. 183 The workload of immigration judges is vast
and the resources are sparse. 184 In granting deferred action to eligible
applicants, judicial resources are conserved for higher priority cases.
Given the high stakes for individuals in removal proceedings who
have lived in the country since childhood and for those with U.S.
citizen and LPR children, these individuals would be more likely to
appeal an unfavorable decision from a judge. By stemming these cases
before they come forward, the president also conserves the resources
of the Board of Immigration Appeals (BIA).
Deferred action also serves judicial economy by alleviating some
of the burdens placed on immigration courts when children are placed
in removal proceedings. With respect to children who have received
deferred action, immigration courts will be saved from expending
effort on identifying the guardian of the child, establishing who will be
responsible for making sure the child attends hearings, and resolving
jurisdictional issues. In the case of U.S. citizen children, their parent's
removal could have collateral consequences which lead to the child
falling into the foster care system. Burdens would then shift to the
family court system. Thus, extending deferred action to undocumented
children conserves the judicial resources of the family courts as well.
Opponents of deferred action argue that the program offers very
minimal and short-term relief to the immigration courts, while
increased enforcement will stem the flow of illegal entry, deter
offenders, and work to eventually shrink the court docket. This
argument fails to recognize high demands on the limited enforcement
resources in the United States. The finite availability of resources
makes it nearly impossible to stop all unlawful entry or to remove the
entire undocumented population. Further, increased enforcement will
lead to larger court dockets. The state of the immigration system prior
to DACA and DAPA is a prime example of this. In the last few years,
ISO See U.S
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deportations have been at their highest level, court dockets have
surged, and enforcement capacity remains at four percent of the
unauthorized population. 185 As such, increasing enforcement alone is
an impractical approach to alleviating the overload on immigration
courts.
C. The Expiration of the Deferred Action Programs Thwarts the Goal
of JudicialEconomy

The short term period of protection and renewal process under
DACA and DAPA thwarts the goal of judicial economy. Once
approved for DACA, a recipient is protected from removal for only
two years. 186 After this period, the recipient must apply for renewal or
the relief will expire. 187 DAPA has a similar restriction except the
renewal period is every three years. 188 President Obama should
eliminate the expiration and renewal process of these deferred action
programs because he has decided to exercise prosecutorial discretion
with respect to these individuals and allowing this protection to expire
will create redundancy and tax judicial and administrative resources.
The general presumption against the judicial reviewability of
prosecutorial discretion is core in American law because it conserves
judicial and administrative resources. Any review of the deferred
action decision after an initial determination, except where the
applicant has become a threat to public safety or national security,
thwarts the goals of judicial economy.
The problem with allowing an individual's deferred action to
expire, or allowing the program to expire entirely, is that individuals
who were once protected under deferred action will be susceptible to
being charged as inadmissible. For these individuals, any traffic stop,
emergency situation involving law enforcement, or trip across state
lines could present an opportunity for law enforcement to discover
their unlawful status, which could in turn lead to removal proceedings.
Given the high stakes for DACA or DAPA eligible individuals who
are in removal proceedings, they will likely exhaust all opportunities
185 Thompson & Cohen, supra note 171.
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to appeal an unfavorable decision. As a result, even though the
executive has already decided to exercise prosecutorial discretion with
respect to such individuals, the executive or the court would need to
make another determination of whether to exercise discretion.
This redundancy in determining whether an individual should
receive prosecutorial discretion creates inefficiency and unnecessarily
expends judicial resources. Prosecutorial discretion is presumptively
unreviewable because it prevents this type of inefficiency. This
potential for redundancy can be eliminated by lifting the two- and
three-year time constraint on DACA and DAPA.
In addition to the potential judicial resources that will be expended
on those whose deferred action protection has expired, the deferred
action renewal process unnecessarily consumes administrative
resources. Processing deferred action renewal applications imposes an
increased workload on USCIS and consequently extends alreadylengthy waiting periods for immigration benefits. In his 2013 State of
the Union address, President Obama recognized that real immigration
18 9
reform requires fixing the immigration system to cut wait times.
Subjecting the deferred action program to an expiration date and
renewal process directly opposes this goal.
After USCIS has made a determination that the deferred action
applicant has satisfied all the requirements for the initial grant of relief,
there is no need to revisit this decision because, with the exception of
any subsequent criminal activity or break in continuous residence,
eligibility will not change. For instance, to qualify for DACA, the
individual must have entered the United States as a child and they
must have maintained continuous residence for at least five years from
the time they entered the United States. Also, they must be under
thirty-one years of age to apply. 190 These characteristics cannot
change. The two requirements that could change, criminal record and
continued residence, can be verified with a simple background check,
which is already part of the renewal process. Further, if the DACA
recipient commits a crime, they are likely to be flagged by ICE and
placed in removal proceedings. During this process the government
will become aware of the recipient's criminal activity.
A background check can also be used to verify whether parents of
U.S. citizen or LPR children who receive deferred action maintain
189 Barack Obama, President of the United States, State of the Union Address
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eligibility for the benefit. Similar to DACA, most of the requirements
for DAPA are immutable. As such, eliminating the two- and three-year
expiration and renewal process and implementing an automatic
background check every few years without affirmative action by the
recipient is an efficient and sensible solution to the time constraint
problems of DACA and DAPA.
It may seem that the burden of the renewal process is minor
compared to the benefit; however, the renewal process presents
unnecessary risks. There is only a one-month window to reapply for
the benefit, and if the applicant does not apply within that one-month
window, the applicant will experience a gap in protection against
removal and in employment authorization. Considering what is at
stake if an individual is placed in removal proceedings or loses
employment authorization, even a short gap in protection is an
unnecessary risk that can be avoided. An automatic two-year
background check, as opposed to a renewal process, does not leave
recipients of deferred action vulnerable to being removed and is less
taxing on administrative resources. For these reasons, the Obama
administration should eliminate the two-year cap for the initial
protection period and the renewal process.
Proponents of the renewal process and the two- and three-year
duration of DACA and DAPA argue that the relief is only meant to be
temporary and traditionally has been limited to two years or less.
Thus, eliminating the two- and three year expiration of the programs
disregards traditional practice and the nature of the relief. Indeed,
deferred action is an interim measure that protects individuals, whose
cases present compelling equities, from removal while their
immigration status remains unresolved. It is for this reason that the
expiration and renewal requirements under DACA and DAPA should
be lifted.
In recent years, deferred action for certain classes of noncitizens
has been limited to two years or less, but within this time, recipients
also have had the opportunity to legalize their immigration status. For
instance, T and U visa applicants 9 1 as well as widows and widowers
of U.S. citizens 192 have been allowed to maintain deferred action status
until they were able to gain legal status-an achievable feat in two
years. The goal of resolving their immigration status is not achievable
in two to three years for DACA and DAPA recipients. DACA eligible
noncitizens need legislative action to legalize their status. Until
191See 2001 T and U Visa Memo, supra note 129.
192 See 2009 Surviving Spouses Memo, supra note 136.

Congress creates a pathway for DREAMers to become lawful
residents, which it has yet to do in over twenty years, their
immigration status will remain in limbo. For DAPA recipients,
however, they may have an available avenue to become permanent
residents because they are immediate relatives of U.S. citizens. Still,
this process may take many years depending on the age of their
children and complexity of their immigration history. Thus, three years
is not a reasonable time to legalize their status. Although DACA and
DAPA applicants may be able to renew their deferred action relief, the
process presents unnecessary risks and creates inefficiency.
Eliminating the expiration and renewal process of DACA and DAPA
will allow recipients a full opportunity to legalize their status.
CONCLUSION

From the local community activist to the famous television actress,
the children of the undocumented population have risen from obscurity
to shed light on some of the most menacing problems in the U.S.
immigration system. By lifting their voices and sharing their stories,
these trailblazers were able to gain wide support for their cause-an
effort that led to deferred action for them and their parents. DACA and
DAPA, which aim to conserve enforcement resources and serve to
protect those who lack the intent to violate laws, advance the goals of
justice and efficiency in the immigration system. Moreover, they allow
undocumented children and undocumented parents of U.S. citizens and
lawful permanent residents to rise out of the shadow population and
continue to make meaningful contributions to United States. Although
the DACA and DAPA programs fall short of immigration reform, they
are stepping-stones on the path to change immigration law and policy.
Given, the high value that is placed on judicial economy in American
jurisprudence, deferred action programs should be protected from
expiration. If President Obama aims to lift the shadow of deportation
from these young people, he should not let the sun set on the recent
deferred action programs.

